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Abstract
A strong correlated equilibrium is a strategy proﬁle that is immune to joint devia-
tions. Diﬀerent notions of strong correlated equilibria were deﬁned in the literature.
One major diﬀerence among those deﬁnitions is the stage in which coalitions can
plan a joint deviation: before (ex-ante) or after (ex-post) the deviating players re-
ceive their part of the correlated proﬁle. In this paper we show that an ex-ante strong
correlated equilibrium is immune to deviations at all stages. Thus the set of ex-ante
strong correlated equilibria of Moreno & Wooders (Games Econ. Behav. 17 (1996),
80-113) is included in all other sets of strong correlated equilibria.
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1 Introduction
The ability of players to communicate prior to playing a non-cooperative game,
inﬂuences the set of self-enforcing outcomes of that game. The communica-
tion allows the players to correlate their play, and to implement a correlated
strategy proﬁle as a feasible non-binding agreement. For such an agreement
to be self-enforcing, it has to be stable against plausible coalitional devia-
tions. Two notions in the literature describe such self-enforcing agreements: a
strong correlated equilibrium is a proﬁle that is stable against all coalitional
deviations, while a coalition-proof correlated equilibrium is a proﬁle that is
stable against self-enforcing coalitional deviations. For a coalition of a single
player, any deviation is self-enforcing. For a coalition of more than one player,
a deviation is self-enforcing if there is no further self-enforcing and improving
deviation by one of its proper sub-coalitions. The main focus of this paper is
on the former notion.
A correlated strategy proﬁle is implemented by a mediator who privately
recommends each player what to play. In the existing literature it is as-
sumed that the mediator reveals all the recommendations simultaneously
([9,13,25,26,29,30]). However, in a more general framework, the mediator may
use a more complex revealing protocol, such as:
• Revealing each recommendation consecutively in a pre-speciﬁed and com-
monly known order. An example for such a protocol is the polite cheap-talk
protocol in [18], which allows players to mimic a mediator, and implement
a large set of strong correlated equilibria as strong Nash equilibria in the
extended game with cheap-talk. 2
• Communicating with the players in a pre-speciﬁed cyclic order, and in-
forming each player at each stage about a new unrecommended action. For
example, if the possible actions of a player are {a, b, c} and his recommen-
dation is a, the mediator may inform him ﬁrst that his recommendation is
not c, and at a later stage inform him that it is not b as well.
• Making a private lottery, and choosing accordingly one of a few possible
protocols.
A revealing protocol is required to satisfy the following two requirements:
• At the end of the protocol each player knows his recommendation.
• No player knows anything about the recommendations of the other players,
2 Cheap-talk is pre-play, unmediated, non-binding, non-veriﬁable communication
among players (see [14] for a good nontechnical introduction). A cheap-talk protocol
is polite if at each stage at most one player sends a message.
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beside the conditional probability given his recommendation.
When the mediator reveals all the recommendations simultaneously, a coali-
tion may communicate and plan a joint deviation before or after the recom-
mendations are revealed. In [25,26,29] it is assumed that players may only
plan deviations at the ex-ante stage, before receiving the recommendations.
In [9,13,30] it is assumed that players may only plan deviations at the ex-post
stage, after receiving the recommendations.
In a general revealing protocol, the players can communicate, share informa-
tion, and plan coalitional deviations at diﬀerent stages of the protocol. Thus,
we further require from the protocol the following: Sharing information among
deviating players would not allow them to know anything about the recom-
mendations of the other players, beside the conditional probability given their
recommendations. The information structure of the deviating players is mod-
eled by an incomplete information model a` la Aumann with the common prior
assumption ([4]).
A coalition agrees to use a joint deviation if it is common knowledge among
its members that the deviation is proﬁtable for all of them. 3 In that case,
the deviation is implemented with the assistance of a new mediator. The new
mediator receives the recommendations of the deviating players at the end
of the revealing protocol, and gives each of them a new recommendation. It
is assumed that if a deviation is implemented, then all the deviating players
follow it, even if new information at a later stage may make the deviation
unproﬁtable. Speciﬁcally, the deviators report their true recommendations to
the new mediator and do not use sub-deviations.
A strategy proﬁle is an all-stage strong correlated equilibrium if, for every
revealing protocol, and for every stage of such a protocol, there is no coalition
with a proﬁtable deviation. A strategy proﬁle is an ex-ante strong correlated
equilibrium ([26]) if there is no coalition with a proﬁtable deviation at the ex-
ante stage. Our main result shows that the two notions coincide: An ex-ante
strong correlated equilibrium is resistant to deviations at all stages of any
revealing protocol. An immediate corollary is that the set of ex-ante strong
correlated equilibria is included in all other sets of strong correlated equilibria,
as deﬁned in the literature mentioned above.
One could hope that similar results might be obtained for the coalition-proof
notions. However, in Section 5 we demonstrate that the ex-ante coalition-proof
notion is not appropriate to frameworks in which coalitions can plan devia-
tions at all stages. In Section 6 we discuss diﬀerent approaches for coalitional
3 The intuition behind the common knowledge requirement is provided in Sec. 3.
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stability, present the diﬀerent notions of strong and coalition-proof equilibria,
and discuss the implications of the main result.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model and the main
result. The result is demonstrated in Section 3, and proven in Section 4. We
deal with the coalition-proof notion in Section 5, and discuss the the implica-
tions of the result in Section 6.
2 Model and Deﬁnitions
2.1 Preliminary Deﬁnitions
A game in strategic form G is deﬁned as: G =
(
N, (Ai)i∈N , (u
i)i∈N
)
, where
N is the ﬁnite and non-empty set of players. For each i ∈ N , Ai is player
i 's ﬁnite and non-empty set of actions, and ui is player i 's utility (payoﬀ)
function, a real-valued function on A =
∏
i∈N
Ai. The multi-linear extension of ui
to ∆ (A) is still denoted by ui. A member of A is called an action proﬁle, and a
member of ∆ (A) is called a (correlated) strategy proﬁle. A coalition S is a non-
empty member of 2N . For simplicity of notation, the coalition {i} is denoted
i. Given a coalition S, let AS =
∏
i∈S
Ai, and let −S = {i ∈ N | i /∈ S} denote
the complementary coalition. A member of ∆(AS) is called a (correlated)
S -strategy proﬁle. Given q ∈ ∆(A) and aS ∈ AS, we deﬁne q|S ⊆ ∆(AS)
to be q|S(aS) =
∑
a−S∈A−S
q(aS, a−S), and for simplicity we omit the subscript:
q(aS) = q|S(aS). Given aS s.t. q(aS) > 0, we deﬁne q(a−S|aS) = q(aS ,a−S)q(aS) .
2.2 All-stage Strong Correlated Equilibrium
A state space is a probability space, (Ω,B, µ) that describes all parameters
that may be the object of uncertainty on the part of the players. We interpret
Ω as the space of all possible states of the world, B as the σ-algebra of all
measurable events, and µ as the common prior.
Given a non-null event E ∈ B and a random variable x : Ω→ X (where X is a
ﬁnite set), let x(E) ∈ ∆(X) denote the posterior distribution of x conditioned
on the event E. The implementation of an agreement (a correlated strategy
proﬁle) by a mediator is modeled by a random variable a : Ω → A, which
satisﬁes that the prior distribution a(Ω) is equal to the agreement distribution.
Deﬁnition 1 Let G be a game, q ∈ ∆(A) an agreement, and (Ω,B, µ) a state
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space. A recommendation proﬁle is a random variable a = (ai)i∈N : Ω → A
that satisﬁes: a(Ω) = q.
A (joint) deviation of a coalition S is a random variable (in Ω) that is condi-
tionally independent of a−S given aS .
Deﬁnition 2 Let G be a game, q ∈ ∆(A) an agreement, S ⊆ N a coalition,
(Ω,B, µ) a state space, and a : Ω→ A a recommendation proﬁle. A deviation
(of S ) is a random variable dS = (di)i∈S : Ω → AS that is conditionally
independent of a−S given aS .
The interpretation is the following: If the players of S agree to use deviation
dS, they implement it with the assistance of a new mediator. The mediator
receives the S -part of the recommendation proﬁle, but he does not receive any
information about the recommendations of the non-deviating players. Thus,
the new recommendations he sends to the deviating players may depend only
on aS , but not on a−S .
When the members of a coalition S consider the implementation of a joint
deviation, they are in a situation of incomplete information: each player may
know his recommendation, and may have additional private information ac-
quired when communicating with the other deviating players. We assume that
the deviating players have no information about the recommendations of the
non-deviating players, beside the conditional probability given the informa-
tion they have about their recommendations. We model this by the following
deﬁnition of a consistent information structure.
Deﬁnition 3 Let G be a game, q ∈ ∆(A) an agreement, S ⊆ N a coali-
tion, (Ω,B, µ) a state space, and a : Ω → A a recommendation proﬁle.
An information structure (of S ) is a |S|-tuple of partitions of Ω (F i)i∈S,
whose join (
∧
i∈S
F i, the coarsest common reﬁnement of (F i)i∈S) consists of
non-null events. We say that (F i)i∈S is a consistent information structure, if
∀ω ∈ Ω, ∀i ∈ S, ∀a ∈ A, a (F i(ω)) (a) = aS (F i(ω))
(
aS
)
· q(a−S | aS).
We interpret F i as the information partition of player i ; that is, if the true
state of the world is ω ∈ Ω then player i is informed of that element F i(ω) of
F i that contains ω.
When each player considers whether the implementation of a deviation is
proﬁtable to him, he compares his conditional expected payoﬀ when playing
the original agreement and when implementing the deviation. A player agrees
to deviate, only if the latter conditional expectation is larger. Formally, let
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G be a game, q ∈ ∆(A) an agreement, S ⊆ N a coalition, i ∈ S a player,
(Ω,B, µ) a state space, a : Ω → A a recommendation proﬁle, dS : Ω → AS
a deviation, and (F i)i∈S a consistent information structure. The conditional
expected payoﬀs of player i in ω ∈ Ω are:
• The conditional expected payoﬀ when all the players follow the agreement:
uif (ω) =
∫
F i(ω)
ui (a(ω)) dµ
• The conditional expected payoﬀ when the members of S deviate, by imple-
menting dS, and the players in −S follow the agreement:
uid(ω) =
∫
F i(ω)
ui
((
dS, a−S
)
(ω)
)
dµ
If the players in S decide to implement a deviation in some state ω ∈ Ω, then
it is common knowledge (in ω) that each player expects to earn if the deviation
is implemented. Formally ([3]):
Deﬁnition 4 Let G be a game, S ⊆ N a coalition, (Ω,B, µ) a state space,
(F i)i∈S an information structure, and ω ∈ Ω a state. An event E ∈ B is
common knowledge at ω if E includes that member of the meet Fmeet = ∧
i∈S
F i
that contains ω.
We deﬁne a proﬁtable deviation with respect to a consistent information struc-
ture of a coalition S, as a deviation that it is common knowledge in some state
of the world, that each deviating player expects to earn more if the deviation
is implemented.
Deﬁnition 5 Let G be a game. q ∈ ∆(A) an agreement, S ⊆ N a coalition,
i ∈ S a player, (Ω,B, µ) a state space, and a : Ω→ A a recommendation pro-
ﬁle. A deviation (of S ) dS is proﬁtable, if there exists a consistent information
structure (F i)i∈S and a state ω0 ∈ Ω such that it is common knowledge in
ω0 that ∀i ∈ S, uid(ω) > uif (ω). In that case, we say that dS is a proﬁtable
deviation with respect to the information structure (F i)i∈S.
We can now deﬁne an all-stage strong correlated equilibrium as a strategy
proﬁle, from which no coalition has a proﬁtable deviation.
Deﬁnition 6 Let G be a game. A strategy proﬁle q ∈ ∆(A) is an all-stage
strong correlated equilibrium if no coalition S ⊆ N has a proﬁtable deviation.
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2.3 Main Result
A proﬁle is an ex-ante strong correlated equilibrium, if no coalition has a
proﬁtable deviation at the ex-ante stage, when the players have no information
about the recommendations.
Deﬁnition 7 Let G be a game and (Ω,B, µ) a state space. A strategy proﬁle
q ∈ ∆(A) is an ex-ante strong correlated equilibrium if no coalition S ⊆ N
has a proﬁtable deviation with respect to the ex-ante information structure
(F i)i∈S that satisﬁes ∀i,F i = Ω.
One can verify that Def. 7 is equivalent to the deﬁnition of ([26]). The deﬁnition
immediately implies that an all-stage strong correlated equilibrium is also an
ex-ante strong correlated equilibrium. The main result shows that the converse
is also true, and thus the two notions coincide.
Theorem 8 A correlated proﬁle is an ex-ante strong correlated equilibrium if
and only if it is an all-stage strong correlated equilibrium.
3 An Example of the Main Result
In the following example we present an ex-ante strong correlated equilibrium
in a 3-player game, and a speciﬁc deviation that is considered by the grand
coalition during a revealing protocol. At ﬁrst glance, one may think that this
deviation is proﬁtable to all the players conditioned on their posterior infor-
mation at that stage, but a more thorough analysis reveals that this is not
the case. The analysis in this example provides the intuition for the use of a
model of incomplete information a` la Aumann ([4]), for the common knowledge
requirement in Def. 5 of a proﬁtable deviation, and for the main result.
Table 1 presents the matrix representation of a 3-player game, where player 1
chooses the row, player 2 chooses the column, and player 3 chooses the matrix.
Table 1
A 3-Player Game With An Ex-Ante Strong Correlated Equilibrium
c1 c2 c3
b1 b2 b3 b1 b2 b3 b1 b2 b3
a1 10,10,10 5, 20,5 0,0,0 5,5,20 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0
a2 20,5,5 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0
a3 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0 7,11,12
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Let q be the proﬁle:
(
1
4
(a1, b1, c1) ,
1
4
(a2, b1, c1) ,
1
4
(a1, b2, c1) ,
1
4
(a1, b1, c2)
)
,
with an expected payoﬀ of 10 to each player. Observe that q is an ex-ante
strong correlated equilibrium:
• The proﬁle q is a correlated equilibrium, and thus no player has a unilateral
proﬁtable deviation.
• No coalition of two players has a proﬁtable deviation, because their uncer-
tainty about the recommendation of the third player prevents them from
earning together more than 20 by a joint deviation.
• The grand coalition cannot earn more than a total payoﬀ of 30.
Now, consider a stage of a revealing protocol in which player 1 has received a
recommendation a1, player 2 has received a recommendation a2, and player 3
has not received his recommendation yet. No player knows whether the other
players have received their recommendations. At ﬁrst glance, the implementa-
tion of the deviation d(·) = (a3, b3, c3), which gives a payoﬀ of (7, 11, 12), may
look proﬁtable to all the players:
• Conditioned on his recommendation (a1), player 1 has an expected payoﬀ
of 62
3
, and thus d is proﬁtable to him. The same is true for player 2.
• Player 3 does not know his recommendation. His ex-ante expected payoﬀ is
10, and he would earn a payoﬀ of 12 by implementing d.
However, a more thorough analysis of player 3's information, reveals that d
is unproﬁtable for him. Player 1 can only earn from d if he has received
recommendation a1. Thus, if player 1 agrees to implement d, then it is common
knowledge that he has received a1. The expected payoﬀ of players 2 and 3,
conditioned on that player 2 has received a1, is 11
2
3
. Thus, if player 2 agrees to
implement d, then he must have more information: that his recommendation
is a2. Therefore player 3 knows that if the other players agree to implement
d, then their part of the recommendation proﬁle is (a1, a2). Conditioned on
that, his expected payoﬀ is 15, and thus d is unproﬁtable for him.
4 The Proof of the Main Result
In this Section we prove the main result. As discussed earlier, one direction
immediately follows from the deﬁnitions, and we only have to prove the other
direction:
Theorem 9 Every ex-ante strong correlated equilibrium is an all-stage strong
correlated equilibrium.
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In other words: If a proﬁtable deviation from an agreement q ∈ 4(A) exists,
then there also exists a proﬁtable ex-ante deviation from q.
PROOF. Let q ∈ ∆(A) be an agreement that is not an all-stage strong
correlated equilibrium in a game G. Let (Ω,B, µ) be the state space, and
a : Ω → A the recommendation proﬁle. Thus there exists a coalition S ⊆ N
with a proﬁtable deviation dS : Ω → AS with respect to a consistent infor-
mation structure (F i)i∈S. This implies that there is a state ω0 ∈ Ω , such
that it is common knowledge in ω0 that ∀i, uid(ω) > uif (ω), i.e., Fmeet(ω0) ⊆{
ω | uid(ω) > uif (ω)
}
. For each deviating player i ∈ S, write Fmeet = Fmeet(ω0) =⋃
j
F ij where the F
i
j are disjoint members of F i, and let ωij ∈ F ij be a state
in F ij . We now construct an ex-ante proﬁtable deviation d
S
e with respect
to the ex-ante information structure (F ie)i∈S, which satisﬁes ∀i, F ie = Ω:
dSe (ω) =

dS(ω) ω ∈ Fmeet
aS(ω) ω /∈ Fmeet
.
Observe that dSe and a
−S are conditionally independent given aS, thus dSe is
a well-deﬁned deviation. Let uide(ω), u
i
fe(ω) be the conditional utilities of the
players with respect to (F ie)i∈S. We ﬁnish the proof by showing that dSe is
proﬁtable, i.e: ∀i ∈ S, ω ∈ Ω, uide(ω) > uife(ω).
uide(ω)− uife(ω) =
∫
F ie(ω)
(
ui
((
dSe , a
−S) (ω))− ui (a(ω))) dµ (1)
=
∫
Ω
(
ui
((
dSe , a
−S) (ω))− ui (a(ω))) dµ (2)
=
∫
Fmeet
(
ui
((
dSe , a
−S) (ω))− ui (a(ω))) dµ (3)
=
∫
Fmeet
(
ui
((
dS, a−S
)
(ω)
)
− ui (a(ω))
)
dµ (4)
=
∑
j
∫
F ij
(
ui
((
dS, a−S
)
(ω)
)
− ui (a(ω))
)
dµ (5)
=
∑
j
uid(ω
i
j)− uif (ωij) > 0 (6)
Equation 2 is due to the equality F ie(ω) = Ω, (3) holds since d
S
e = a
−S outside
Fmeet, (4) holds since dSe = d
S in Fmeet, (5) follows from Fmeet =
.⋃
j
F ij , and
the last inequality is implied by Fmeet ⊆
{
ω | uid(ω) > uif (ω)
}
. QED.
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5 Coalition-Proof Correlated Equilibria
In Sec. 4 we have shown that an ex-ante strong correlated equilibrium is
also appropriate to frameworks in which players can plan deviations at all
stages. A natural question is whether a similar result holds for the notion of
coalition-proof correlated equilibrium. 4 We show that the answer is negative,
by presenting an example, adapted from [9], in which there is an ex-ante
coalition-proof correlated equilibrium that is not a self-enforcing agreement in
a framework in which communication is possible at all stages. Table 2 presents
a two-player game and an ex-ante coalition-proof correlated equilibrium.
Table 2
A Two-Player Game and an Ex-ante Coalition-Proof Correlated Equilibrium
b1 b2 b3
a1 6,6 -2,0 0,7
a2 2,2 2,2 0,0
a3 0,0 0,0 3,3
b1 b2 b3
a1 1/2 0 0
a2 1/4 1/4 0
a3 0 0 0
We ﬁrst show that the proﬁle presented in Table 2 is an ex-ante coalition-
proof equilibrium. First, observe that the proﬁle is a correlated equilibrium.
[26] shows that in a two-player game, every correlated equilibrium that is
not Pareto-dominated by another correlated equilibrium is a coalition-proof
correlated equilibrium. The proﬁle gives each player a payoﬀ of 4. Thus we
prove that it is an ex-ante coalition-proof correlated equilibrium, by showing
that any correlated equilibrium q gives player 1 a payoﬀ of at most 4. Let
x = q (a1, b1). Observe that q (a2, b1) ≥ x/2 because otherwise player 2 would
have a proﬁtable deviation: playing b3 when recommended b1. This implies
q (a2, b2) ≥ x/2, because otherwise player 1 would have a proﬁtable deviation:
playing a1 when recommended a2. Thus the payoﬀ of q conditioned on that
the recommendation proﬁle is in A = ((a1, b1) , (a2, b1) , (a2, b2)) is at most 4,
and because the payoﬀ of q conditioned on that the recommendation proﬁle
is not in A is at most 3, then the total payoﬀ of q is at most 4.
We now explain why this proﬁle is not a self-enforcing agreement in a frame-
work in which the players can also plan deviations at the ex-post stage. Assume
that the players have agreed to play the proﬁle, and player 1 has received a
4 Recall ([26]) that an ex-ante coalition-proof correlated equilibrium is a strategy
proﬁle from which no coalition has a self-enforcing and improving ex-ante deviation.
For a coalition of a single player any ex-ante deviation is self-enforcing. For coalitions
of more than one player, an ex-ante deviation is self-enforcing if there is no further
self-enforcing and improving ex-ante deviation by one of its proper sub-coalitions.
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recommendation a2. In that case, he can communicate with player 1 at the
ex-post stage, tell him that he received a2 (and thus if the players follow the
recommendation proﬁle they would get a payoﬀ of 2), and suggest a joint de-
viation: playing (a3, b3). As player 1 has no incentive to lie, player 2 would
believe him, and they would both play (a3, b3). This ex-post deviation is self-
enforcing because (a3, b3) is a Nash equilibrium.
Observe that the same deviation is not self-enforcing in the ex-ante stage. If
the players agree at the ex-ante stage to implement a deviation that changes
(a2, b1) into (a3, b3), then player 2 would have a proﬁtable sub-deviation: play-
ing b3 when recommended b1. Similarly, if they agree to implement a deviation
that changes (a2, b2) into (a3, b3), then player 1 would have a proﬁtable sub-
deviation: playing a1 when recommended a2.
6 Discussion
6.1 Approaches for Coalitional Stability
Self-enforcing agreements in environments where players can freely discuss
their strategies before the play starts have to be stable against coalitional
deviations. A few notions in the literature present diﬀerent approaches for
coalitional stability.
The ﬁrst approach, is the Pareto dominance reﬁnement, in which the set of
Nash equilibria is reﬁned by restricting attention to its eﬃcient frontier. This
approach is popular in applications due to its advantages: existence in all
games and the simplicity of its use. However, when there are more than 2
players, it ignores the ability of coalitions other than the grand coalition to
privately agree upon a joint deviation. 5
Another approach is to explicitly model the procedure of communication as
an extended-form game that speciﬁes how messages are interchanged (e.g.:
[5,15,28]). However, the results are sensitive to the exact procedure employed,
and usually strong restrictions have to be made to isolate the desired outcome.
A diﬀerent approach is the farsighted coalitional stability. Alternative varia-
tions are discussed in: [10,16,17,24,33,34]. 6 These notions focus on environ-
ments where deviations are public. At each stage coalitions propose deviations
5 As discussed in [6,35]. [35] presents a set of conditions that if satisﬁed, the two
notions of Pareto dominance reﬁnement and coalition-proof equilibrium coincide.
6 Also called negotiation-proof equilibrium and full coalitional equilibrium.
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from the current status-quo outcome, until nobody wishes to deviate further.
The set of possible ﬁnal outcomes is deﬁned using stable sets a` la von-Neumann
& Morgenstern ([32]). This approach is less appropriate when coalitions can
privately plan deviations. 7
6.2 Strong and Coalition-Proof Equilibria
A Nash equilibrium is strong ([2]) if no coalition, taking the actions of its com-
plement as given, has an uncorrelated deviation that beneﬁts all of its mem-
bers. The main drawback of this notion, is that it exists in only a relatively
small set of games. 8 [6] presents a wider reﬁnement of Nash equilibrium, which
exists in more games: a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium. A Nash equilibrium
is coalition-proof if no coalition has a proﬁtable self-enforcing uncorrelated
deviation. For a coalition of a single player any deviation is self-enforcing. For
coalitions of more than one player, a deviation is self-enforcing if there is no fur-
ther self-enforcing and improving deviation by one of its proper sub-coalitions.
9 The notion of coalition-proof equilibrium has been useful in a variety of ap-
plied contexts, such as: menu auctions ([7]), oligopolies ([8,11,12,31]), and
common agency games ([22]).
These notions focus on environments where coalitions can privately commu-
nicate before the play starts, and plan a joint deviation. However, they ignore
the fact that the same private communication allows the players to correlate
their moves. This deﬁciency is overcome by the notions of strong and coalition-
proof correlated equilibria. A correlated equilibrium is strong if no coalition
has a (possibly correlated) joint deviation that beneﬁts all of its members. The
7 [34, Section 1] presents an example for the diﬀerence between a negotiation-proof
equilibrium and a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium. Observe that the negotiation-
proof equilibrium in this example, the proﬁle (U,L,A), is not a plausible outcome
if the coalition ({1, 2}) can privately deviate.
8 Examples for games where strong Nash equilibria exist are congestion games
([19]); games where the preferences satisfying independence of irrelevant choices,
anonymity, and partial rivalry ([20]); and games where the core of the cooperative
game derived from the original normal form game, is non-empty (see [21], and the
references within). Conditions for the equivalence of strong and coalition-proof Nash
equilibria are presented in [21] (games with population monotonicity property) and
in [22] (common agency games).
9 Observe that only members of the deviating coalition may contemplate deviations
from the deviation. This rules out the possibility that members of the deviating
coalition might form a pact to deviate further with someone not included in this
coalition. This limitation has been criticized, especially in the literature that deals
with the farsighted coalitional stability approach (described earlier).
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close connection between strong correlated equilibrium and private pre-play
communication is demonstrated by:
• The result in [18], which shows that any punishable 10 ex-ante strong
correlated equilibrium is a strong Nash equilibrium in an extended game
with cheap-talk. 11
• The example in [27] of an ex-ante strong correlated equilibrium that is the
only plausible outcome of a game with pre-play communication, as experi-
mentally demonstrated in the referred paper.
6.3 Relations among Diﬀerent Notions of Strong Correlated Equilibria
A deﬁciency of the notion of strong correlated equilibrium, is that there are
six diﬀerent variants of it in the literature: three ex-ante notions and three ex-
post notions. In this subsection we present those notions, the relations among
them, and the implications of the main result.
Notions of ex-ante strong correlated equilibria have been presented in [26,29,25].
As discussed in Sec. 2, our ex-ante deﬁnition is equivalent to the deﬁnition in
[26]. In [29] deviating coalitions are not allowed to construct new correlation
devices, and are limited to use only uncorrelated deviations. 12 In [25] only
some of the coalitions can coordinate deviations. In both cases the sets of fea-
sible deviations is included in our set of deviations, and thus our set of ex-ante
strong correlated equilibria is included in the other sets of equilibria.
An ex-post strong correlated equilibrium can be deﬁned in our framework,
as a proﬁle which is resistant to deviations at the ex-post stage when each
player knows his recommendation (i.e., no coalition S ⊆ N has a proﬁtable
deviation with respect to an ex-post information structure (F i)i∈S, in which:
∀ω ∈ Ω, ∀i ∈ S, ∃ai ∈ Ai s.t. ai (F i(ω)) (ai) = 1).
10 Loosely speaking, a strategy proﬁle is punishable if it Pareto-dominates another
strategy proﬁle, even when the deviating players do a joint scheme.
11 The implementation presented in [18] is only as a bn/2c-strong Nash equilibrium:
an equilibrium that is resistant to deviations of coalitions with less than n/2 players. If
one assumes that the players are computationally restricted and one-way functions
exist, then the implementation can be as a strong Nash equilibrium (see [1,23]).
12 In [29]'s setup, the mediator can send an indirect signal to each player, which
holds more information than the recommendation itself. In that case, the uncorre-
lated deviation is a function from the set of the S -part of the signals to the set of
uncorrelated S -strategy proﬁles. In our framework, in which coalitions can use new
correlation devices, any ex-ante strong correlated equilibrium that can be imple-
mented by indirect signals, can also be implemented by a direct correlation device.
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Notions of ex-post strong correlated equilibria have been presented in [13,30,9].
In [13] a deviating coalition can only use deviations that improve the condi-
tional utilities of all deviating players for all possible recommendation pro-
ﬁles. 13 In [30] a coalition S can only use pure deviations (functions dS : AS →
AS). In [9], a coalition S can only use deviations that are implemented if the
recommendation proﬁle aS is included in some set ES ⊆ AS which satisﬁes:
(1) If aS ∈ ES, each player earns from implementing the deviation;
(2) If aS /∈ ES, at least one player looses from implementing the deviation.
It can be shown that those conditions imply the existence of a proﬁtable
deviation with respect to an ex-post information structure. 14 Thus our set of
ex-post strong correlated equilibria is included in the other sets of equilibria.
The main result reveals inclusion relations among the diﬀerent notions of
strong correlated equilibria, which described in Fig. 1. 15 Thus, [26]'s ex-ante
notion is much more robust than originally presented: It is an appropriate
notion not only for frameworks where players can only communicate before
receiving the recommendations of the correlated agreement, but to any pre-
play mediation and communication framework.
Figure 1. Relations among Diﬀerent Notions of Strong Correlated Equilibria (SCE)
6.4 Coalition-proof Correlated Equilibria
A correlated equilibrium is coalition-proof if no coalition has a (possibly cor-
related) proﬁtable self-enforcing deviation. Again, a deﬁciency of this notion
13 It is equivalent to requiring that ∀i ∈ S, ω ∈ Ωuid(ω) > uif (ω).
14 The information structure is such that each deviator would know his recommen-
dation and whether aS(ω) ∈ ES .
15 See [26, Section 4] for an example of an ex-post strong correlated equilibrium that
is not an ex-ante equilibrium.
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is that there are six diﬀerent variants of it in the literature (3 ex-ante and 3
ex-post). 16 It is possible to extend the model of incomplete information, and
deﬁne a notion of all-stage coalition-proof correlated equilibrium, by using an
appropriate notion of consistent reﬁnements of information structures. How-
ever, the example in Section 5 shows that this notion does not coincide with
the ex-ante coalition-proof notion, nor that there is any inclusion relations
among the diﬀerent coalition-proof notions. 17 Thus, the notion of coalition-
proof correlated equilibrium is not robust: it is sensitive to the exact properties
of the revealing protocol.
6.5 Extensions of the Main Result
(1) Bayesian games: [26] presents a notion of ex-ante strong communication
equilibrium in Bayesian games. The main result can be extended to this
setup as well, to show that an ex-ante strong communication equilibrium
is resistant to deviations at all stages.
(2) k-strong equilibria: In [18] an ex-ante notion of k-strong correlated equi-
librium is deﬁned as a strategy proﬁle that is resistant to all coalitional
deviations of up to k players. The main result can be directly extended to
this notion as well: An ex-ante k -strong correlated equilibrium is resistant
to deviations of up to k players at all stages.
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